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Alterations and unpredictability of the network topology in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are less capable of ensuring the
security of multicast data transmissions than in conventional networks. Despite the recent development of many key agreement
protocols for MANETs, to our knowledge, only a few secure multicast data transmissions have been integrated into the key
agreement. This study proposes a dynamic multicast height balanced group key agreement (DMHBGKA) that allows a user in
a multicast group to eﬃciently and dynamically compose the group key and securely deliver multicast data from a multicast
source to the other multicast group users in wireless ad hoc networks. The hierarchical structure of the proposed key agreement
partitions the group members into location-based clusters capable of reducing the cost of communication and key management
when member joins or leave networks. Moreover, based on elliptic curve Diﬃe-Hellman (ECDH) cryptography key management,
the proposed scheme not only provides eﬀective and eﬃcient dynamic group key reconstructions and secures multicast data
transmissions but also fits the robustness of the wireless networks and lowers overhead costs of security management.
1. Introduction
As an emerging paradigm of wireless communication for
mobile nodes, ad hoc networks have received considerable
attention in recent years due to a rapid expansion of
wireless devices and the interest in mobile communica-
tions. In an ad hoc network [1–3], mobile nodes want to
communicate with each other, but have no fixed links like
a wire infrastructure network. While acting as a router,
each node is responsible for discovering dynamically other
nodes in a transmission range [4]. The emergence of ad
hoc networks poses a challenge for maintaining the security
of a group multicast since mobile ad hoc networks diﬀer
from conventional wired networks. Security is thus a priority
concern in wireless networks, especially for security-sensitive
applications. Computer security attributes of confidentiality,
integrity, availability, authentication, and nonrepudiation are
crucial to protect communications in ad hoc networks.More-
over, the network topology of an ad hoc network changes
frequently and unpredictably, explaining why security is
extremely challenging in routing and multicasting. In prac-
tice, establishing a trusted entity referred to as a certification
authority (CA) by using a single node in ad hoc networks is
a rather complex task. For an unavailable or compromised
CA due to a vulnerable network structure, the entire secure
communication cannot access the public keys of other nodes
[5–8].
Many security protection schemes have been developed
for an individual multicast group. Some schemes address
single-security-level group communications by using Diﬃe-
Hellman algorithm extending contributory key management
and logical key hierarchy [9]. While describing how a
multicast group user can compose a group key, this study
presents a hierarchical group key management to multicast
data from a multicast source to the remaining multicast
members securely. We hypothesize that capable of acquiring
the measures, that is, latitude, longitude, and altitude,
from global positioning system (GPS) mobile nodes have
a hierarchical structure. Additionally, group members are
partitioned into location-based clusters to reduce the cost
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of key management. Moreover, encryption and decryption
operations are presented for secure multicast communica-
tions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the related security aspects of secure multicast
communications in ad hoc networks. Section 3 then presents
a secure multicast key agreement. Next, Section 4 introduces
the proposed dynamic multicast height balanced group key
agreement (DMHBGKA) scheme and the process of rekeying
for participating and departing nodes. Additionally, Sec-
tion 5 discusses secure multicast communication operations.
Section 6 summarizes the simulation and analytical results
for the proposed scheme. Conclusions are finally drawn in
Section 7, along with recommendations for future research.
2. Related Security Aspects of Secure Multicast
Communications in Ad Hoc Networks
The role of multicasting as a scalable solution for group
communication in MANETs has ushered in the development
of many group key management approaches. While those
schemes normally focus on improving security and reducing
the size of group keys, forward and backward confidential
information should also be provided for multicast applica-
tions whenever a user joins or leaves the system. Kim et al.
[7] developed a tree-based group key agreement scheme by
using a binary tree infrastructure to compute and update
a group key eﬃciently. That study also completed secure
and distributed protocols by exploiting the group Diﬃe-
Hellman (GDH) key exchange. Vasudevan and Sukumar [10]
developed a scalable secure multicast algorithm by using a
multiserver approach when the data encryption key (DEK)
had to be changed. To minimize the rekeying cost, their
schemes utilize the dynamic split and merge with a low
overhead cost, where a physical server splits and merges its
traﬃc into multiple groups, with each group served by a
dedicated server. Wang et al. [11] developed a hybrid group
key management scheme with a two-level structure where
the group users are subdivided into clusters, subsequently
reducing the rekeying cost as key updating. While developing
a scheme that ensures key and data authenticity among
group members, Chiang and Huang [12] demonstrated the
data confidentiality of group messages with the properties of
forward and backward confidential information. The group
key is established collaboratively by combining the keys
of all authenticated members, which assists in maintaining
the communication and computation transparency among
group members. Chaddoud et al. [13] divided group
members into several operation units to perform microkey
management. Compared with the logical key hierarchy
(LKH), the above schemes can more significantly reduce the
overload of the key server and provide more eﬃcient key
management for a secure wireless multicast. However, the
above schemes lack eﬃcient key management mechanisms
for members to participate in or leave MANETs dynamically.
Despite the considerable attention paid to grouping or
clustering issues for reducing traﬃc overhead and broadcast
storm problems of MANETs, reducing the rekeying costs in
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Figure 2: A elliptic curve with P +Q + R = O.
key updating and increasing the key management eﬃciency
have seldom been addressed in group key management
schemes that focus on clustering issues. Clustering algo-
rithms for MANETs have been developed to reduce commu-
nication costs betweenmobile nodes. Even numerous mobile
nodes require only a few cluster headers to manipulate
wireless communications.
Our previous work developed a key-distribution graph
model by using the Pru¨fer decoding algorithm for secure
multicast communications in MANETs [12]. A key graph
is a directed acyclic graph G with two nodes, that is, leaf
nodes (N-nodes) representing multicast-user nodes and K-
nodes representing keys [13]. Each N-node representing a
multicast-user node has one outgoing edge associated with
the individual key of each user node. EachK-node has one or
more incoming and outgoing edges. If only having incoming
edges and no outgoing edge, a K-node is a root of the key
graph. Kp-node denotes a group key held by each user in N .
Moreover, a key-distribution graph specifies a secure group
(N ,K ,P) as follows:
(1) each multicast-user node in G corresponds to a
unique N-node,
(2) each individual key corresponds to a unique K-node,
(3) the group key Kp has a direct path from all K-nodes.
For instance, the key graph in Figure 1 specifies the following
secure group:
N = {N1,N2,N3, . . . ,Nn},
K = {K1,K2,K3, . . . ,Kn},
P = {Kp}.
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Figure 5: A multicast group in MANETs.
3. Secure Multicast Key Agreement
This section introduces multicast key management schemes
and maintenance concepts that provide location-based mul-
ticast secure communications by using elliptic curve Diﬃe-
Hellman agreement and geographic position information to
deliver packets to multicast trees securely.
3.1. Elliptic Curve Diﬃe-Hellman Key Management Agree-
ment. Since MANETs have limited resources, many security
schemes provide high security level functions, such as
asymmetric key and public key infrastructure (PKI), but
they need a lot of resources; therefore, mobile networks
cannot perform the security functions very well. To date,
several studies have adopted elliptic curve Diﬀe-Hellman-
(ECDH-) based security methods for networks, such as the
studies by Sklavos and Zhang [14], Szczechowiak et al. [15],
and Liu and Ning [16]. Sklavos and Zhang developed a
hardware design and architecture for elliptic curve cryp-
tography (ECC). Szczechowiak et al. investigated the ECC
boundary and proved that public key cryptography was
practical for wireless networks. Liu and Ning generated an
implementation library and an executable package for ECC.
This session briefly introduces the ECC and ECDH
schemes [17] for implementation in this study. Table 1
compares the security levels of common cryptographic key
lengths. Smaller key size 160-bit in the ECC performs
comparable security levels to 1024-bit RSA. The ECC has
eﬃcient operation and is indeed practicable for wireless
networks with limited resources.
An elliptic curve is topologically equivalent to a torus
over a finite field GF (a Galois field of order p), as shown
in Figure 2 and comprises a set of finite points (xi, yi), where
coordinates xi, yi are integers and satisfy
y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x + a6. (1)
The coeﬃcients ai are elements in GF(p), since the field
GF(p) (p ∈ prime) is generally adopted in cryptographic
applications, such that the elliptic curve in (1) can be
translated into Ep(a, b)
y2 = x3 + ax + b (mode p), (2)
where a and b belong to GF(p). Considering two points on
curve P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2), and a point at infinity
O, where P /=Q /=O, points P, Q and O satisfy the following
rules:
(1) P +O = O + P = P, P + (−P) = O,
(2) (x1, y1) + (x1 − y1) = P + (−P) = O,
(3) P + Q = R = (x3, y3) on the curve, where x3 = λ2 −






x2 − x1 if P /=Q,
3x21 + a
2y1
if P = Q.
(3)
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280 80 160 1024 1/6 1012
2112 112 224 2048 1/9 1024
2128 128 256 3072 1/12 1028
2192 192 384 7680 1/20 1047
2256 256 512 15360 1/30 1066
However, given points P and Q on the curve, if the discrete
logarithm of Q to base P, denoted as K , is large, then
calculating the value of K where PK = Q is infeasible. The
ECC requires the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
being simple to solve.
The elliptic curve Diﬃe-Hellman (ECDH) is a variant
of the Diﬃe-Hellman (DH) key agreement protocol, using
elliptic curve cryptography that allows two parties to estab-
lish a shared secret key (session key) over an insecure chan-
nel. Two parties then exploit this key to encrypt subsequent
communications using a symmetric key scheme. The ECDH
with 160-bit key lengths provides the same security level to
a 1024-bit DH secret sharing protocol [15, 16]. However,
the original DH protocol needs a key of at least 1024 bits
to achieve adequate security; therefore, it requires high CPU
and memory capabilities to perform exponential operations.
Unfortunately, mobile nodes with limited resources have
insuﬃcient power to handle the overhead. Therefore, ECDH
is quite suited for MANETs.
Consider the case in ECDH, where mobile node A
wants to establish a shared key with node B, as shown in
Figure 3. The public parameters (a prime p, a base point
P as a generator in Diﬀe-Hellman, coeﬃcients a and b,
and elliptic curve y2 = x3 + ax + b) must first be set.
Additionally, each party must have an appropriate key pair
for elliptic curve cryptography, comprising an ECC private
key K (a randomly selected integer) and a public key Z
(where Z = KP). Let a node key pair of A denote (KA,ZA),
and a node key pair of B denote (KB,ZB). Each party
must have the other party’s public key. Node A calculates
ZA = KAP, while node B calculates ZB = KBP. Both
parties calculate the shared key as S = KAZB = KAKBP =
KBKAP = KBZA. The protocol is secure because it reveals
nothing (except public keys, which are not secret), and
because no party can calculate the private key of the other
unless it can solve the Diﬃe-Helman problem (DHP) [18].
ECDH scheme is suited for ad hoc networks with limited
resources. Each node only needs a few operations to achieve
compatible security levels on RSA or Diﬀee-Hellman. This
study exploits ECDH on group-based key managements
and secure data transmission mechanisms and proposes a
dynamic multicast height balanced group key agreement
to achieve eﬀective and eﬃcient key synchronization, even
though nodes dynamically participate in and depart from the
wireless network.
3.2. The Clustering Scheme for Choosing Cluster Head. This
section describes the selection steps for cluster headers in the
location-based multicluster architecture shown in Figures 4
and 5. The clustering scheme partitions a large group into
a hierarchy of recursively organized subgroups based on
a distributed geographic hashing method. A mobile node
wanting to join a multicast group takes x and y coordinates
as inputs of a hash function and then outputs a unique
region ID. This node subsequently sends a HELLO message,
including the region ID, x and y coordinates. In the same
region, the fact that each node with a unique ID realizes
x and y coordinates of its one-hop neighbors allows it to
determine which one has the shortest distance to the center
of the wireless network area. The node with the shortest
distance is selected as a cluster head and then broadcasts
a cluster message to the remaining nodes. Following the
clustering phases, the system determines 16 clusters in this
system, that is, 0, 1, . . . , 15. Each cluster head subsequently
exploits the proposed DHBGKA scheme to generate a group
key (GKi) for each cluster member to ensure secure multicast
communications.
4. Dynamic Multicast Height Balanced Tree
In ad hoc networks, mobile nodes join or leave networks
dynamically, necessitating that the system performs group
key reconstructions frequently. This work presents a dynamic
multicast height balanced group key agreement (DMH-
BGKA) to achieve dynamic multicast key management. The
DMHBGKA tree has the following attributes.
(1) DMHBGKA tree is a special binary search tree in
which the subtrees of each node diﬀer in height by at
most one. Additionally, each subtree is a DMHBGKA
tree, as shown in Figure 6.
(2) Balance factor (BF) denotes the height diﬀerence of
left and right subtrees, while BF = |HL − HR|  1,
where HL denotes the height of a left subtree, and HR
denotes the height of a right subtree.
(3) A node joining or leaving networks leads to a
tree unbalance. The proposed DMHBGKA scheme
adjusts procedures to rebalance the tree. The pro-
cedures are classified into categories of left rotation
(LL), left-right rotation (LR), right rotation (RR),
and right-left (RL) rotations. The procedure is
adjusted as follows.
Step 1. According to the binary search tree rule, place (or
remove) the new joining (or leaving) node in (or from) the
correct place, depending on its ID (MAC or IP address).
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 5
Step 2. Calculate the BF of each node, which belongs to
(0,−1, or 1). If not, the DMHBKA tree loses balance.
Step 3. Adopt LL, RR, LR, and RL mechanisms to perform
unbalanced adjustments.
Step 4. Reconstruct the balanced DMHBGKA tree.
A node joins or leaves the networks. The time complexity
associated with searching the target node is O(log n) (n
denotes the number of nodes); the system only needs to
modify the link point of the data structure and thus takes
O(1) time complexity. As the DMHBGKA tree is unbalanced,
in a worst case scenario, the adjusting procedure must move
a leaf node from the bottom to the root position and at
most takes O(log n). Given that the DMHBGKA tree is
eﬀective and eﬃcient for dynamic mobile networks, this
study exploits DMHBGKA to manage the dynamic group as
described in detail in the following.
4.1. Dynamic Multicast Height Balanced Group Key
Agreement—DMHBGKA. First, based on the node’s ID
(MAC or IP), this study utilizes the binary search tree
algorithm to locate the node in the DMHBGKA tree, as
shown in Figure 7. The system then performs ECDH key
management agreement from leaf nodes to the root node.
Initially, leaf nodes 1 and 3 perform ECDH to obtain the
session key K1K3P. Nodes 1 and 3 as well as their parent node
2 then calculate the subgroup key K1K2K3P cooperatively.
Next, nodes 5 and 7 perform ECDH to obtain the session key
K5K7P. Nodes 5 and 7 as well as their parent node 6 calculate
the subgroup key K5K6K7P cooperatively. By using the same
procedure, nodes 2 and 6 obtain K1K2K3K5K6K7P and then
deliver it to node 4. Root node 4 then determines the group
key K1K2K3K4K5K6K7P for this tree. Consequently, the root
node 4 unicasts securely the group key to each node.
Figure 8 shows that new nodes 8 and 9 join the system.
According to the DMHBKA agreement, nodes 8 and 9 are
located in the right subtree, and then the adjusting procedure
is performed to maintain the tree balance. The group key
is subsequently calculated as K1K2K3K4K5K6K7K8K9P. If the
root node leaves, as shown in Figure 9, the system selects the
largest ID node from either the left subtree or the smallest ID
node from the right subtree to replace the root node. Nodes
1 and 2 subsequently leave, with the system performing the
adjustment procedure and recalculating the new group key
as K3K5K6K7P in Figure 9.
The proposed mechanism identifies the joining or
leaving node in O(log n), and only needs to recalculate
the key value from the part of the joining (leaving) node
subtree without recalculating the entire tree, thus saving
a tremendous amount of operational time. The proposed
approach is eﬀective and eﬃcient, and the DMHBGKA
algorithm is shown in Algorithms 1 and 2 :
4.2. Interregion Key Exchange Agreement. As the multicast
data cross diﬀerent regions, this study proposes a region key
mechanism to secure the transmitted data between regions.
For instance, the multicast path is region 1→ region 5→
region 9→ region 13, as shown in Figure 10. Each pair of
root nodes must calculate the interregion key between them
using the ECDH agreement. Following calculations, this
study derives the interregion key K1K2K3 · · ·K11K12K13K14P
for CH7 in region 1 and CH14 in region 5. The interregion key
K8K9K10 · · ·K19K20K21P is for CH14 in region 5 and CH21 in
region 9. The interregion key K15K16K17 · · ·K26K27K28P is
for CH21 in region 9 and CH28 in region 13. Subsequently,
the source node and destination node exploit the group and
interregion keys to perform secure multicast communica-
tions.
5. Secure Multicast Communications
This section describes the secure operations for multicast
communications in MANETs. Figure 10 presents a multicast
group and tree, and a multicast source node N1 allocated
on region 1 is assumed here to want to transfer data to
all multicast members which are drawn in dotted circles.
For simplicity, a description is made of the encryption and
decryption operation of secure multicast from multicast
source node N1 to destination node N25, that is, one of the
multicast members in region 13.
This work assumes that the multicast tree is generated by
the multicast source and the path from multicast source to
destination node N25 is known. To distinguish between the
cluster groups, this study transfers the entire range of the
wireless network into a geographical position. The cluster
headers are responsible for the secure multicast backbone
transmission.
When the multicast source node N1 wants to transfer
multicast data to the destination node N25, N1 is located in
region 1 and belongs to the cluster header node N7. First,
secure communications must be ensured between node N1
and the cluster header node N7 belonging to the multicast
backbone network.
To ensure data integrity issues, this study adopts hash
message authentication code (HMAC) functions to generate
HMAC(data) and aggregate HMAC(data) with original
multicast data as [data|HMAC(data)]. Securemulticast com-
munication procedures are described in detail as follows:
N1 −→ N5
EKGK1[EKK1K25P[data|HMAC (data)]].
Initially, N1 and N25 cooperatively calculate their ses-
sion key K1K25P along the multicast backbone, and
then N1 encrypts the [data|HMAC(data)] using K1K25P
as EKK1K25P[data|HMAC(data)]. Additionally, the member
node is located in the same region and has the same
group key GK1 =K1K2K3K4K5K6K7P. Therefore, the mul-
ticast resource node N1 located in region 1, as shown in
Figure 10, encrypts [EKK1K25P[data|HMAC(data)]] using
GK1 to ensure the security of transmitted data in region 1.
This operation ensures that the nodes in adjacent regions 0,
2, 4, 5, and 6 cannot decrypt the encrypted data from the
multicast source node.
Subsequently, N1 sends the encrypted data to the next
node N5. After receiving the data, N5 decrypts the encrypted
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{
if( current == null ) // insert null node
{ current = new DMHBGKA Node(value, null, null); }
else if(value < current.value) // less than current node value/
{ current.left = DMHBGKA Insert(value, current.left);
if(height(current.left) - height(current.right) == 2)
// unbalance occurs//
{if(value < current.left.value)
{current = Rotate Left Child(current); //LR
Groupkey Reconstruction( rootnode, current) //from current node to root }
else
{current = Doublerotate With Left Child(current); //LL
Groupkey Reconstruction( rootnode, current) //from current node to root//}
}
}
else if(value > current.value)// it is greater than current node//
{current.right = DMHBGKA Insert(value, current.right);
if(height(current.right) - height(current.left) == 2)
// there is an imbalance//
{ if(value > current.right.value)
{current = Rotate Right Child(current); //RL
Groupkey Reconstruction( rootnode, current) //from current node to root// }
else
{current = doublerotate Right Child(current); //RR







Algorithm 1: DMHBGKA Insert (int value, point current).
data EKGK1[EKK1K25P[data|HMAC(data)]] using GK1. Sub-
sequently, N5 encrypts the [EKK1K25P[data|HMAC(data)]]
using GK1 again, and deliveries them to the cluster head CH7
N5 −→ CH7
EKGK1[EKK1K25P[data|HMAC(data)]].
Once the encrypted data are received, since N5 and CH7
are located in the same region and have the same group
key GK1. CH7 can decrypt the encrypted data. Subsequently,
CH7 must deliver the data to cluster head CH14 in region 5.
Since the transmission data cross diﬀerent regions, thus CH7
and CH14 cooperatively calculate the interregion key RK1,5 =
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{
if( node == null)
{System.out.println(del val +“Not found in DMHBGKA Tree\n”); return null;}
else
{ // search for del val to be deleted//
if(node.value < del val)
{node.right = DMHBGKA Remove( del val, node.right); }
else if( node.value > del val)
{ node.left = DMHBGKA Remove( del val, node.left);}
// del val found, delete if a descendant is null //
else if( node.left == null)
{ node = node.right;}
else if( node.right == null)
{node = node.left; }
//no descendant is null, rotate on heavier side//
else if( height( node.left ) > height( node.right ))
{ node = Rotate Right Child(node); //RL
node.right = DMHBGKA Remove( del val, node.right );
Groupkey Reconstruction( rootnode, current) //from current node to root//}
else
{ node = Rotate Left Child( node ); //LR
node.left = DMHBGKA Remove( del val, node.left );
Groupkey Reconstruction( rootnode, current) //from current node to root//}
//reconstruct weight information //
if( node != null )




Algorithm 2: DMHBGKA Remove (int del val, point node).
K1K2K3 · · ·K14P, and then CH7 encrypts [EKK1K25P[data |
HMAC(data)]] using RK1,5 as [EKRK1,5[EKK1K25P[data |
HMAC(data)]]]. Subsequently, CH7 sends the encrypted
data to the backbone cluster head CH14
CH7 −→ CH14
EKRK1,5[EKK1K25P[data|HMAC(data)]].
CH14 receives the transmitted data and decrypts them
using RK1,5. Subsequently, CH14 encrypts the received
data using RK5,9 = K8K9K10 · · · · · ·K19K20K21P as
[EKRK5,9[EKK1K25P[data | HMAC(data)]]], and sends them
to the next cluster head CH21. By repeating the above
procedures, the encrypted data are transmitted to cluster
head CH28 allocated in region 13.
8 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
h− 1
h− 2 h






























Figure 7: Group key exchange agreement.
The cluster head CH28 is responsible for transmitting
the received data to the destination node N25. Since CH28,
N27 and N25 are located in the same region; therefore,
they have the same group key. CH28 adopts the group key
GK13 = K22K23K24 · · ·K28P to encrypt the received data and
transmits the encrypted data to the intermediate node N27
CH28 −→ N27
EKGK13[EKK1K25P[data|HMAC(data)]].
Upon receiving the transmitted data, N27 decrypts the
encrypted data using GK13, encrypts the results using GK13,
and sends the encrypted data to the destination node N25
N27 −→ N25
EKGK13[EKK1K25P[data|HMAC(data)]].
Upon receiving the encrypted data, N25 decrypts them using
GK13 and session key K1K25P, and verifies the integrity
of HMAC(data). If any changes take place during the
transmissions, the receiving node detects the modifications
immediately by verifying the HMAC. Thus, the proposed
secure multicast schemes satisfy the following security
analyses.
(1) Confidentiality and Authentication. During the data
transmission, this study exploits the group and interregion
keys to encrypt the multicast data. Only the node with the
same group or interregion keys can decrypt the transmitted
data. The other nodes are not aware of the group and
interregion keys; therefore, cannot decrypt the encrypted
data. Thus, the scheme can ensure that the data transmission
is confidential and authentic.
(2) Data Integrity and Accuracy. This study employs message
authentication code (HMAC) to verify the integrity of trans-
mitted data. During the transmission, each node calculates
HMAC, and the receiver verifies the integrity of HMAC.
Since HMAC is an irreversible operation, given a random
number y, no ways can compute x such that H(x) = y.
Moreover, when a /= b, thenH(a) /=H(b). Therefore, if any
nodes modify the transmitted data during transmissions,
the receiver detects the unmatched HMAC instantly and
recognizes the tampered data.
6. Analyses
6.1. Communication Cost Evaluation. The communication
cost of ad hoc networks is an immensely complex prob-
lem [19]. The main complicity arises when attempting to
consider irregular geographical distribution and any sources
of interference (such as maintaining clusters, bandwidth,
CPU, memory, and network traﬃc). This study adopts hop
counts to evaluate communication costs, because this is the
most widely used measure. In the proposed cluster-based
models, it is logical to assume that ad hoc networks have
m × n mobile nodes and are located on a 2D coordinate.
These mobile nodes are allocated on the intersections as
shown in Figure 11. This study attempts to compute the min-
hop-count for any two nodes in the proposed model, for
simplicity the following terms are defined.
Nab: denotes a mobile node allocated on coordinate
(a, b).
Minhop(Nab,Ncd): represents the minimal hop count
between node Nab and Ncd.
AVMinhop: is the average minimal node-hop-count
for any two nodes in this model.
AVCBMinhop: denotes the average minimal cluster-
hop- count for any two clusters in this model.
A: is a set containing {1, 2, . . . ,m} or A =
{1, 2, . . . ,m}.


















(Nab,Ncd), a /= c, b /=d.
(4)
Bab: represents the number of a×b grids in themodel,
where a, b /= 1.
Generally, V represents the sum of Minhop between
two nodes, which is parallel to the Y-axis. Meanwhile, H
represents the sum of Minhop between two nodes, which
is parallel to the X-axis. Furthermore, Bab represents the
number of grids a × b in an m × n model. Finally, R is the
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Figure 9: When root node, nodes 1 and 2, leave, the system performs adjusting procedures and recalculates the group key.
Minhop sum of all diagonal line pair nodes belonging to
a grid a × b. From the aforementioned terminologies, the
following equations are established:
V = n ·
m−1∑
i=1
(m− i)i = n(m− 1)m(m + 1)
6
,
H = m ·
n−1∑
i=1
(n− i)i = m(n− 1)n(n + 1)
6
,
Bab = (m− a + 1)(n− b + 1),





Bab · (a + b− 2)




From (5), The AVMinhop is determined to be (m + n)/3 as
follows:


















= (nm(n +m)(nm− 1)/6)
Cnm2
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Figure 10: Secure multicast data communication between nodes 1 and 25.
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Multicast
member
Figure 11: The mobile ad hoc networks model.
Applying (6), the cluster distribution model determined
and the AVCBMinhop can be calculated for any two clusters.
The cluster model is assumed to be denoted as an a×bmodel,
and moreover to satisfy three conditions.
(1) Each cluster domain has the same number.
(2) Every cluster domain has a · b nodes; these nodes lie
on a× b grid, and every intersection is only allocated
a node.
(3) The gateways between two clusters are located on the
boundary lines.
For clarity, an example is presented for explanatory
purposes. Let the ad hoc networks be represented by a 7 × 5
model, while the cluster domain is a 4×2 model, each cluster
allocates eight nodes, and the double bold lines represent
one cluster domain as shown in Figure 12. The above model
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shows that the system is divided into eight cluster domains.
This study realizes that cluster Ch1 comprises of node set
= {Ni j | i = 1, 2, 3, 4. j = 1, 2}, and each cluster Chi (i =
1, 2, 3, . . . , 8) has eight nodes. The gateway nodes between
clusters Ch1 and Ch3 are the node set= {N12,N22,N32,N42),
which indicates the boundary between two rectangles. In an
m × n network model with an a × b cluster model, (a − 1)
divides (m − 1) and (b − 1) divides (n − 1). Since each
cluster can be treated as a node, which represents a cluster
head, then the set of all clusters can be represented as a
((m − 1)/(a − 1)) × ((n − 1)/(b − 1)) network model, and
AVCBMinhop can be computed the same as AVMinhop. From
(6), AVCBMinhop = ((m − 1)/(a − 1) + (n − 1)/(b − 1))/3.
For a 31× 21 network model and a 4× 3 cluster model, then
from (6), AVMinhop = (m+n)/3 = (31+21)/3 = 17.333, and
the average minimum cluster-hop-count for any two clusters
AVCBMinhop is
((m− 1)/(a− 1) + (n− 1)/(b− 1))
3
= ((31− 1)/(4− 1) + (21− 1)/(3− 1))
3






The ratio of the communication cost between any two cluster
heads and any two nodes is AVCBMinhop/AVMinhop =
6.666/17.333. Generalizing this equation under the m × n
network model and the a× b cluster model, and it becomes
AVCBMinhop
AVMinhops
= ((m− 1)/(a− 1) + (n− 1)/(b − 1))/3
(m + n)/3




where a, b /= 1. Generally, (8) is lower than 1. This calculation
result implies that the cluster-based average minimum
cluster-hop-count is below the normal-based minimum
node-hop-count. That is, the cluster-based model outper-
forms the normal node-based model.
Considering the additional communication costs of
node-based AVMinhops and cluster-based AVCBMinhop, the
node-based communication costs of two neighboring nodes
are assumed to be λ, in which case the costs of cluster-
based two neighbor clusters will be ω · λ. The ω denotes
the nodes passing through between two neighbor clusters,
which generally is 1  ω  Max(a, b). Since two clusters
could pass through a gateway node or even multiple nodes
when communicating with each other, the ω depends on
the position of the cluster head and the cluster topology.
Equation (8) then is generalized to be equivalent to
R = ((m− 1)/(a− 1) + (n− 1)/(b− 1)) · ωλ
(m + n) · 1λ




(1, 5) (2, 5) (3, 5) (4, 5) (6, 5) (7, 5)







Figure 12: 7× 5 ad hoc networks, 4× 2 cluster domain.
If a  b  2, then regardless of the values of m and n
R ≤ ((m− 1)/(b − 1) + (n− 1)/(b− 1)) · ω
(m + n)






Furthermore, where m,n 1 (a, b  2), (9) is
R ∼=
(




(1) When m = n  1. Equation (11) is R ∼= (a + b −
2)/(a− 1)(b− 1)× ω/2.
(2) Whenm n, 1. Then n/(n+m) → 0, andm/(n+
m) → 1, (11) is R ∼= ω/(a− 1).
(3) When n  m, 1. Then n/(n +m) → 1, and m/(n +
m) → 0, (11) is R ∼= ω/(b− 1).
From the result of the derivation, R (ratio of (AVCBMinhop−
−communicative−−costs)/(AVMinhop−−communicative−
−costs)) shows that the cluster-based approach outperforms
the normal node-based one, at least in situations where the
proposed model achieves better communication costs.
6.2. Computational Costs of DMHBGKA. This section evalu-
ates the performances of DMHBKA, tree-based group Diﬃe-
Hellman (TGDH) and groupDiﬃe-Hellman (GDH). Table 3
summarizes the computational costs for several operations.
Key Operations. As a node leaves or joins the multicast tree
dynamically, the entire system must reconstruct the group
key. However, the operation only aﬀects a specific portion
of the subtree of the joining (leaving) node. Therefore, in
a worst case scenario, for a leaf node joining or leaving the
tree, the system recalculates the group key at most h times,
where h denotes the height of the tree. The system normally
recalculates the new group key for i times, where i denotes
the level of the joining (leaving) node. Generally, the system
recalculates the group key from the inserted (deleted) node
12 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
Table 2: Simulation parameters.
CPU/Memory 3.2GHz/1G
Operation system XP




Simulation time 600 s
Max speed 20m/s
Region area 1500m× 1500m
A point multiplication (SEC-160) 0.18 s
ECDH session 5.2 s
position at level i to the root node. Therefore, the number of
exponential operations is (1 + i) i/2. However, in the GDH
scheme, each nodemust recalculate its partial group key, thus
taking more key operations than DMHBKA and TGDH do.
Node Operations. The average search time for the joining
(or leaving) node in the DMHBGKA tree is[
∑n
i=1 level(i)]/n.
Moreover, the system must only modify the data structure of
the link point for a joining (or leaving) node, and therefore,
it takes O(1) time complexity. Additionally, the number of
multicast member nodes in the DMHBGKA tree is at most
2h−1 and the minimum is Fab(h+2)−1. Nevertheless, GDH
identifies a specific node at most n and the minimum is 1.
Communications. Data communication for a group key
requires i rounds, while a node joins because each node sends
one message from its level i to the root node. The root
node then broadcasts the group key to each node in the
tree. The total number of messages is n + i + 1. Although
DMHBGKA broadcasts more rounds than GDH and TGDH
do, the message size is significantly lower than that of GDH
and TGDH.
6.3. Group Key Agreement Performance Evaluation. In
this study, each node only conserves a session key to
encrypt/decrypt data, and exploits a hash function, such
as HMAC-160 or RIPEMD-160, to verify the integrity
of transmitted data. However, hash functions and session
key operations consume few resources during secure data
transmissions. Consequently, the plain operations are highly
suited for MANETs.
Additionally, several analyses of various key cryptosys-
tems are performed. The experiments are implemented on
a Windows XP platform with a 3.2-GHz Celeron(R) CPU,
1-GB of memory, and a GNU C/C++ Library. The nodes
move within a fixed region area 1500m× 1500m, and
node mobility is simulated based on a random waypoint
mobility model. Each node moves toward a randomly
selected location at a speed uniformly distributed between 0
and max speed and then pauses for a configured time, before
selecting another random location and repeating the process.
The mobile nodes pause time has value of (0, 30 s, 60 s, 120 s,
300 s, and 600 s), with 0 representing constant mobility and
600s indicating a stationary network. In a simulated network
of nodes (25, 50, 75, 100, and 150), simulations are for
constant node speeds of (0m/s, 5m/s, 10m/s, 15m/s, and
20m/s), using the above pause time, and where every node
has performed several ECDH operations. The mobile node
calculates a point multiplication in 0.18 s on SEC-160 curve
[20] and 5.2 s to establish a session key on ECDH in the
prime field. Key synchronization time and data transmission
time on interregion infrastructures are evaluated. Moreover,
the proposed ECDH secure multicast data transmission
session is also simulated to measure the performance on
interregion mode. Table 2 lists the simulation parameters.
The key length of a security level is expressed as the pair
〈x, y〉, where x denotes the private key length in DMHBGKA,
and y denotes the private key length in DH/RSA [21].
DMHBGKA requires only multiplication operations whereas
DH andGDH [22, 23]must perform exponential operations.
Therefore, DMHBGKA takes much less computing time than
DH and GDH. Results in Figure 13 indicate that DMHBGKA
needs a shorter synchronization time than DH and GDH in
〈160 bits, 1024 bits〉 and 〈224 bits, 2048 bits〉. Additionally,
Figure 13 describes the estimated synchronization time of
the group key for DMHBGKA, DH and GDH schemes.
According to this figure, DMHBGKA takes less time than
DH and GDH to achieve group key convergence. Figure 14
compares the two regions in terms of the synchronization
time of the interregion key. Simulation results indicate
that the DMHBGKA schemes outperform GDH and DH
ones. This advantage is owing to that each cluster head is
responsible for its cluster member key controller. Therefore,
each pair of the cluster heads must only exchange their
own group keys, making it possible to synchronize the new
interregion key between two clusters without recalculating
keys of all members in two clusters. Figure 15 indicates
that cluster schemes outperform noncluster schemes in
terms of synchronization time of the group key. This study
divides all members into cluster-2, cluster-4, and cluster-8
structures. The simulation increases the number of cluster
members from 1 to 32 sequentially, which is accompanied
by implementing a group key. According to Figure 15,
the convergent time increases with the number of cluster
members. Moreover, cluster-8 performs the best in terms of
reconstructing the group key.
Figure 16 shows the resynchronization time of the group
key for adding or removing a node. Simulation results
indicate that the DMHBGKA scheme takes less resynchro-
nization time for nodes joining or leaving than DH and
GDH since the point multiplication takes considerably less
time than exponential operations. Furthermore, DMHBGKA
must only recalculate the partial key from the place of a
joining or leaving node to the root node, yet it does not need
to recalculate keys of all members, subsequently achieving
synchronization eﬃciently.
Figure 17 compares DMHBGKA, DH, and GDH schemes
in terms of secure multicast data transmission time. Simula-
tion results indicate that the DMHBGKA scheme performs
better than other ones in terms of passing through nodes.







































1 2 4 6 8 10










Figure 14: Synchronization time of the interregion key between two
regions.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
This study presents a dynamic height balance group key
agreement (DMHBGKA) scheme to ensure secure multicast
data transmissions. The proposed scheme achieves the same
security level as RSA and Diﬀe-Hellman do with shorter
keys. Additionally, the proposed scheme performs very well
for dynamic nodes joining or leaving. Simulation results
indicate that in addition to consuming less system key
synchronization time than other methods do, the proposed
DMHBGKA scheme is also highly feasible for implementing
constrained environments such as ad hoc networks.
Additionally, this study provides resilient and scalable
mechanisms for dynamic group key management. The
proposed scheme replaces exponential operations with point
multiplications when performing ECDH, thus reducing
the CPU overhead significantly. Therefore, the proposed
scheme is highly promising for dynamic key operations
in large-scale ad hoc networks. This study also presents
a node in the multicast group, capable of exploiting the
interregion key to deliver multicast messages securely from
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Figure 17: Comparison of secure multicast data transmission time.
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themulticast source to the internodes of themulticast tree. In
addition to integrating the DMHBGKA scheme into secure
multicast data transmissions, the proposed scheme provides
secure communications among regions. Furthermore, the
proposed approach utilizes ECDH key operations and a
rapid hash function for secure multicast data transmission
and data integrity verification, respectively, thus eliminating
the requirement for complex operations on mobile nodes.
Analytical results indicate that the proposed DMHBGKA
scheme outperforms other methods in terms of rekeying
performances, computation and communication costs, and
overhead. Importantly, the proposed schemes are eﬃcient
and scalable for numerous mobile nodes in ad hoc networks.
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